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"We don't have much money, but we're dignified
And happy in our Appalachianpride"
-June Carter Cash, AppalachianPride (1975).1
I.

INTRODUCTION

When considering justice for Appalachia, a powerful political polemic
2
be
perceived in proper perspective. The so-called What's the Matter
should
argument ("WTM argument") patronizingly assumes-without actually
knowing-that entire parts of the nation like Appalachia act or vote against their
own self-interest. This polemic, unfortunately, has poisoned previous' and
present' discussions about Appalachian justice.
The WTM argument, explored in Part I, essentializes' Appalachians
beyond any legitimate empirical inferences. In statistical terms, it lacks
reliability6 and validity.' Although individual Appalachians might act against
their self-interest, what makes the argument polemical is its sweeping categorical
inferences about all Appalachians that simply are not supported by its flawed

I
2

JUNE CARTER CASH, Appalachian Pride,on APPALACHIAN PRIDE

(Columbia Records 1975).
This polemic was made popular by two books from opposing ends of the political

spectrum-liberal Thomas Frank's Democrat-apologizing book What's the Matter with Kansas?,
and conservative Jack Cashill's Republican counterattack What's the Matter with California?.See
JACK CASHILL, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH CALIFORNIA?: CULTURAL RUMBLES FROM THE GOLDEN
STATE AND WHY THE REST OF US SHOULD BE SHAKING (2007); THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE
MATTER WITH KANSAS? How CONSERVATIVES WON THE HEART OF AMERICA (2005).

See Nicholas F. Stump & Anne Marie Lofaso, De-Essentializing Appalachia:
3
Transformative Socio-Legal Change Requires Unmasking Regional Myths, 120 W. VA. L. REV.
823 (2018); see also RONALD ELLER, UNEVEN GROUND: APPALACHIA SINCE 1945, 89 (2008);

Elizabeth Catte, Liberal Shaming of Appalachia: Inside the Media Elite's Obsession with the

2017,
7:00
SALON
(Mar.
21,
"Hillbilly
Problem, "
https://www.salon.com/2017/03/21/liberal-shaming-of-appalachia-inside-the-media-elitesobsession-with-the-hillbilly-problem/.
4

PM),

See Stump & Lofaso, supra note 3, at 825-29; Catte, supra note 3.

5
Essentialism assumes that one or a few members of a group represent the entire group. Will
Rhee, Entitled to Be Heard: Improving Evidence-BasedPolicy Making Through Audience and
Public Reason, 85 IND. L.J. 1315, 1328, 1328 n.71 (2010) (citation omitted).
6
Statistical reliability is "the extent to which it is possible to replicate a measurement,
reproducing the same value (regardless of whether it is the right one) on the same standard for the
same subject at the same time." Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L.

REV. 1, 83 (2002).
Statistical validity is "the extent to which a reliable measure reflects the underlying concept
7
being measured." Id. at 87.
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sampling (the "stereotyping sampling error"). This stereotyping sampling error
is literally the dictionary definition of discrimination.'
Despite its polemical nature, however, the WTM argument makes
empirical statements about its intended audience or beneficiaries, namely poor
Appalachians. When evaluating justice for Appalachia, the starting point should
be public scrutiny of empirical evidence assessing whether Appalachians living
in Appalachia' or forced by work to migrate"o have prospered or perished under
the reach of a particular law, policy, or political leader."
Part II analyzes limited empirical evidence to test the WTM argument.
Despite Appalachia's clear swing from Democrat to Republican U.S.
Presidential candidates since 1980, there is empirical evidence to suggest thatconsistent with a previous empirical studyl 2-Appalachian Presidential voting
patterns overall have not been significantly more anomalous than national
Presidential voting patterns."
Focusing on an audience like Appalachians can bridge deep partisan
divides. Liberals, conservatives, and independents can agree that the party in
power, the law that just passed, or the newly adopted policy should ultimately be
judged by how much they actually measurably improve real, individual
Appalachian lives.
Moreover, Appalachian essentialism can be strategically turned on its
head to unite otherwise marginalized Appalachians into an empowered
Appalachia with the political and popular influence equivalent to the third largest

For example, Webster's Dictionary defines "discrimination" as "the act, practice, or an
instance of discriminating categorically rather than individually." Discrimination, MIRIAMWEBSTER: DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/discrimination (last visited
Mar. 29, 2018).
9
Although Appalachia has multiple definitions, this Essay adopts the Appalachian Regional
Commission's statutory definition of Appalachia as spanning the length of the Appalachian
Mountains, including parts of 12 states-Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Mississippi,
New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia-and all
of West Virginia. See 40 U.S.C. §§ 14101, 14102 (2012); see also The Appalachian Region,
APPALACHIAN

REGIONAL

COMMISSION,

https://www.arc.gov/appalachian-region/TheAppalachianRegion.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
10
"Urban Appalachians" are native Appalachians who were forced to leave Appalachia to find
work. During the so-called Great Migration of the 1940s to 1960s, four million resident
Appalachians moved to Eastern and Midwestern cities in search of work. About Urban
Appalachians, URBAN APPALACHIAN COMMUNITY COALITION, http://uacvoice.org/about-urbanappalchians/ (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
"
See Rhee, supra note 5, at 1317-18.
12
See Robert Bickel & Cheryl Brown, Appalachian Counties in AppalachianStates: Is There
a Distinctively Appalachian Voting Pattern?, 14 J. APPALACHIAN STUD. 99 (2008).
13
This analysis implements standard statistical approaches to examine select variables related
to economic growth and prosperity alongside presidential voting patterns from 1980 to 2016 to
discover to what extent, if at all, they are correlated. The availability of these data at the county
scale lends itself to incorporation of spatial analysis using Geographic Information Systems (GIS).
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state in the nation. Such an audience focus by Appalachians for Appalachians
can, echoing June Carter's words,14 unify all Appalachians in dignified
Appalachian pride.
II. WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH APPALACHIA?

With the election of President Donald Trump, the U.S. media has been
accused of seeking to stereotype Appalachia as "mythic Trump Country."" A
seductive frame through which to view Appalachians remains the WTM
argument, made famous by Thomas Frankl 6 and Jack Cashill." The argument's
current manifestation appears to be, what is the matter with Appalachians? Why
are they voting against their own self-interest?" Frank himself has called it the
"Appalachification of much of the United States."l9 Appalachian political
scientist David Sutton agrees with Frank.20 As the transparently titled No
Sympathy for the Hillbillyasserted, some commentators believe that it is "a fool's
errand ... to cater to the white-identity politics of the hard-core, often selfsabotaging Trump voters who helped drive the country into a ditch on Election
Day."

21

Despite its aspirations to explain empirical evidence, the WTMargument
commits the stereotyping sampling error.22 The WTM argument ultimately is
about value choices; it is really for its own tribe's benefit, not the other tribe's; it

14

See CASH, supra note 1.

See Catte, supranote 3 (collecting media coverage during the 2016 election); Catherine V.
Moore, Dissatisfiedwith the National Media's Frame, AppalachiaFinds Its Own Voice, COLUM.
JOURNALISM REV. (July 6, 2017), https://www.cjr.org/local news/appalachia-journalism.php. As
Moore summarized,
Even before Donald Trump's election, Appalachia was treated as a kind of
Rosetta stone for deciphering rural white poverty in America. In its aftermath,
media inquiries ... confirmed many residents' deep-seated fear that the
national press only shows up when the news is bad, or to make them look like
fools or freaks. Instead of inviting input on how to frame their stories, reporters
seemed to be looking for people to fit a frame they already had in mind.
Id.
15

16
17

FRANK, supra note 2, at 1-2.
CASHILL, supra note 2, at 5-7.

18
Frank himself recognized "the state of West Virginia, one of the poorest in the nation, in the
process of transforming itself into a conservative redoubt." FRANK, supra note 2, at 259.
19
Thomas
Frank,
Storybook Plutocracy, PUB.
BOOKS
(Nov.
21, 2013),
http://www.publicbooks.org/storybook-plutocracy/.
20
Accord David Sutton, Living Poor and Voting Rich, 32 APPALACHIAN J. 340, 343 (2005).
21
Frank Rich, No Sympathy for the Hillbilly: Democrats Need to Stop Trying to Feel
Everyone's Pain, and Hold on to Their Own Anger, NYMAG.COM (Mar. 19, 2017, 9:00 PM),
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/03/frank-rich-no-sympathy-for-the-hillbilly.html.
22
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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ignores deep stories and thereby refuses to scale the empathy wall; and the actual
empirical evidence testing it is mixed.
A.

The WTM Argument's True Audience Is Its Base, Not the Opposition

Because it is a 'self-fulfilling prophecy preaching to the converted, the
WTM argument-in both its liberal and conservative manifestations-fails to
persuade the other side. Instead, it causes the unpersuaded to fear blame shifting.
1.

Love Liberals and Blue-Collar Workers, Problem Solved

Frank's WTMargument is that poor conservatives vote against their selfinterest because of the so-called "Great Backlash," which "mobilizes voters with
explosive social issues"23 like abortion, guns, and faith24 "marr[ied] to probusiness economic policies. Cultural anger is marshaled to achieve economic
ends."25 Although not the first to make this argument, Frank's exposition might
be the most popular.2 6
Frank's solution to conservatives' allegedly paranoid, irrational hatred
of liberal Democrats 27 is twofold. First, love Democrats. With fundamentalist
fervor, Frank believes that "the Democrats are the party of workers, of the poor,
of the weak and victimized. Understanding this .. .is basic; it is part of the ABCs
of adulthood."28 So, according to Frank, someone who is not a Democrat
apparently is not an adult. Frank's fellow Democrat echoes his obsequious
orthodoxy, "'How can anyone who has ever worked for someone else ever vote
Republican?' she asked. How could so many people get it so wrong?"29
Second, Frank criticizes his Democratic Party for "forget[ting] bluecollar voters and concentrat[ing] instead on recruiting affluent, white-collar
professionals who are liberal on social issues."30 By minimizing economic

23

FRANK, supra note 2, at 5.

Id. at 5-7.
Id. at 5. Although Frank's book appears limited to Kansas, it really applies to the entire
United States. When sold overseas, the same book was entitled What's the Matter with America?.
See THOMAS FRANK, WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH AMERICA?: THE RESISTIBLE RISE OF THE
AMERICAN RIGHT (2011), https://www.penguin.co.uk/books/1037129/what-s-the-matter-withamerica/.
26
See Larry Bartels, What's the Matter with What's the Matter with Kansas?, 1 Q. J. POL. SC.
201, 201 (2006) (citing authorities since 1969).
24

25

27

FRANK, supra note 2, at 135-36.

28

-Id.atl1.

29

Id.

30

Id. at 243; see also THOMAS FRANK, LISTEN LIBERAL: OR, WHAT EVER HAPPENED TO THE

PARTY OF THE PEOPLE? 47 (Metropolitan Books 2016).
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issues, Democrats, according to Frank, enabled conservative ignorance of
economic problems and conservative focus on the culture wars.31
2. Love Traditional Values, Problem Solved
Rivaling Frank in self-assuredness, Cashill's WTM argument is that
California's "zero-sum multiculturalism"3 2 has wrought a litany of otherwise
avoidable self-inflicted wounds: an "enthusiasm for gates and fences;"3 3 a "lack
[of] a sense of humor;" 34 "eternal victimization for the poor and eternal
employment for the do-gooders;"" high taxes;3 6 excessively expensive
environmentalism that only the rich can afford;37 overly regulated, pricey, and
"sustainable" energy utilities that resulted in infamous energy blackouts and
coerced renewable energy sources;3 8 "excessive worker's comp[ensation]
payments;"39 "staggering drug and alcohol abuse;"40 excessive lawsuits ("often
on 'civil-rights' charges");4 1 high number of lifetime welfare recipients;4 2 high
black father absenteeism;4 3 high number of unwed black mothers;44 high black
murder rate;4 5 high black incarceration rate;4 6 lack of housing opportunities;4 7
growing disagreement and despair over the assimilation of immigrants "into the
fabric of the United States;"4 8 and rampant illegal immigration, especially in

supranote 2, at 176.

31

FRANK,

32

CASHILL, supra note 2, at

33

Id. at 15-16.
Id. at 187-89.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 88-89.

34
3
36

38

Id. at 172-73, 193-98.
Id. at 172-73, 181-84.

3

Id. at 88.

40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id. at 86.

43

Id. at 86-87.

44

Id.

45

Id. at 71.

46

Id. at 73.

47

Id. at 97.

48

Id. at 233.

3

31.
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"sanctuary cities."4 9 Cashill's solution is a return to traditional values like
52
fatherhood,o family, faith, patriotism," and self-control.
As both Frank's and Cashill's respective partisan hit jobs demonstrate,
the problem with so-called "culture" is that by definition culture is antiempirical. Culture, admits Frank, is an "infinitely malleable malefactor, upon
which any evil design can be projected."" Such malleability is demonstrated by
Frank and Cashill's contradictory cultural WTM explanations. According to
Frank, culturally conservative Republican Kansas embodies the traditional
values Cashill champions as California's cure-all. In the same manner, by.
Cashill's account, predictably progressive Democratic California has been
faithfully following Frank's formula for fortune.
Although quoting from the same WTM cultural credo and agreeing on
the same adversarial ad hominem attacks, normative nemeses Frank and Cashill
cannot in reality both be right. Battling over California's zero-sum
4
multiculturalism, which allegedly states, "I'm OK, you're not," one of them (if
not both) must be factually wrong.
3.

Don't Blame Us for Our Own Misfortune

In his book, Frank recounts what he calls-probably quite accurately to
Cashill or any other thoughtful U.S. citizen-one of the "most ill conceived
liberal electoral efforts of all time," the British Guardiannewspaper's scheme to
have its readers write more than 11,000 personal letters to voters in swing vote
Clark County, Ohio (not part of Appalachia") to persuade them to vote
Democrat, not Republican, in 2004.56 As any red- (or, for that matter, blue-)
blooded American (or is it "Merican"?) would guess, the well-intentioned
foreign letters basically had the opposite effect. The title of a news story
5
surveying U.S. responses to the Guardian campaign says it all.
The disastrous Guardian letter-writing campaign demonstrates
patronizingly telling voters that they are voting against their own self-interest is

52

Id. at 230-3 1.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 325-26.

53

FRANK,

49
5o

51

54

s5
56

supra note 2, at 136.
Id. at 31.
See 40 U.S.C. §§ 14101, 14102 (2012).
FRANK, supra note 2, at 135.

(Oct.
18,
GUARDIAN
57
See Dear Limey Assholes,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/oct/18/uselections2004.usa2.
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an ineffective way to persuade them to change. The WTM argument has
catalyzed an entire genre of social science literature 9 and a panoply of public
engagement organizations 6 o seeking to understand and bridge entrenched
political partisanship.
The supposed beneficiaries (or victims) of the WTM argument might
suspect that the argument's real purpose is to blame them for their own
misfortune. An Appalachian advocate who calls himself the "Thoughtful Coal
Miner" opined that Appalachians viewed such liberal paternalism as elitist victim
blaming:
This is all obvious to us "ignorant hillbillies." It is also obvious
to us that we are frequently characterized as simple-minded
white trash in the national media and by faux hillbilly
authors .... And we know why this happens: because this kind
of caricature makes it seem to be our fault. Like we were too
dumb to leave when the coal industry crashed. Like we are the
ones too stupid to understand the environmental costs.... For
many Appalachians, the coal industry is a necessary evil for both
our economic and cultural survival. We are quite literally
damned if we do, and damned if we don't.
We know we don't have a choice. Why doesn't the rest
of the nation understand this too?61
A Princeton professor concurred, stating that Frank's liberal WTM
argument is "particularly satisfying for liberal intellectuals because it puts the
blame on poor people rather than those like them."62 Demonstrating blaming's
bipartisanship, Cashill's conservative WTM argument blames liberals for many

58

See Matthew Feinberg & Robb Willer, From Gulf to Bridge: When Do Moral Arguments

FacilitatePoliticalInfluence?, PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 1-3 (2015) (collecting

authorities); see also J. L. Sullivan & J. E. Transue, The Psychological Underpinnings of
Democracy: A Selective Review of Research on Political Tolerance, Interpersonal Trust, and
Social Capital, 50 ANN. REv. PSYCHOL. 625, 625-50 (1999).
s9
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why We Can't "JustAll Get Along": Dysfunction in the Polity
and Conflict Resolution and What We Might Do About It, 2018 J. Disp. RESOL. 5, 16-24 (2018)
(summarizing research).
60
See Members Directory, NAT'L COALITION FOR DIALOGUE & DELIBERATION,
http://ncdd.org/map (last visited Feb. 25, 2018); see also Arlie Russell Hochschild, A Response to
William Davies "'A Review ofArlie Russell Hochschild's Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and
Mourning on the American Right," 30 INT'L J. POL. CULTURE & Soc'Y. 422, 422-23 (2017).
61
Nick Mullins, Don't Tell Coal Country, 'That's What You Get for Voting for Trump,'
HUFFPOST (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/dont-tell-coal-country-thatswhat-you-get-for-voting us_5a2eb58ee4b0e5443a092a82 (emphasis omitted).
62
Thomas
Frank,
Class
Is
Dismissed,
1
&
n.1
(citation
omitted),
https://www.tcfrank.com/media/TCFRANKClassDismissed_2005.pdf
(unpublished
manuscript) (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
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avoidable ills, including the Jonestown massacre,6 ' Taliban traitor John Walker
Lindh, 64 and failing minority schools. 65
Fearing such elitist, caricatured blame shifting, famed University of
California Berkeley sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild moved to Lake
Charles, Louisiana, to get to know individual members of the so-called Tea Party
movement ("Tea Partiers")6 6 in "the heartland of the American right" for five
years. 67 Inspired by Frank, 68 Hochschild sought to answer the same question as
70
the WTM argument6 9 without succumbing to its stereotyping sampling error.
Although she stretched out of her liberal comfort zone and came to
deeply understand friends with fundamentally different worldviews, Hochschild
admitted that at the end of the day, nobody changed their political positions. In
the 2016 election, she still voted Democrat and her Louisiana Tea Party buddies
still voted Republican." "Purchased political influence is real, powerful, and at
play," wrote Hochschild, but the "duping-and the presumption of gullibility" at
the core of the WTMargument "is too simple an idea." 72 In its place, Hochschild
offers a more sophisticated view of the partisan socio-cultural wars.
B. The WTM Argument Ignores Our Deep Stories
Frank and Cashill are unduly dismissive of their partisan adversary's
socio-cultural worldview.73 in contrast, Hochschild understands that people may
74
perceive voting in accordance with their values to be in their self-interest. Isn't
75 What causes
politics' purpose to address fundamental moral questions?
otherwise reasonable and informed people of all partisan persuasions to engage

63

CASHILL, supra note 2, at 146.

64

Id. at 275.

Id. at 255-59; see also supra notes 32-49 and accompanying text.
66
See THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY
REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM 10-13 (2012) (defining the Tea Party).
65

67

AND THE REMAKING OF

ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, STRANGERS IN THEIR OwN LAND: ANGER AND MOURNING ON

THE AMERICAN RIGHT ix-xii (2016).

68

Id. at 8-9.

69

71

Id.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Id. at 237.

72

Id. at 14.

73

See supra notes 23-25, 32-52 and accompanying text.

7o

HOCHSCHILD, supra note 67, at 15 (citing JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY
74
GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012); SKOCPOL & WILLIAMSON, supra

note 66).
See Jon A. Shields, In Praiseof the Values Voter, WILSON Q., Autumn 2007, at 32, 35.
75
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in the sweeping othering, stereotyping sampling error,76 and shoddy reasoning of
the WTM argument is what Hochschild calls the "empathy wall."
1. Blocked by the Empathy Wall
An empathy wall "is an obstacle to deep understanding of another
person, one that can make us feel indifferent or even hostile to those who hold
different beliefs or whose childhood is rooted in different circumstances." 77
Empathy walls divide not only Frank and Cashill from their erstwhile audiences
but also Frank from Cashill. Entrenched in their own tribalism, they too are
blinded by their own socio-cultural values.
Such unwillingness to see inherent hypocrisy is what is the matter with
the WTM argument. Through his liberal Democratic lens, Frank assumes that
more government is the solution for Kansans' empirical ills. Faith in
government is a value. Through his conservative Republican lens, Cashill
similarly assumes that traditional American values are preferable to
multiculturalism. 79 Privileging traditional American values is a value choice as
well.
2. Scaling the Empathy Wall
Although Hochschild admits she is a Democrat who agrees with Frank,s0
she refused to make the stereotyping sampling error." Instead, she decided to
leave her liberal Berkeley bubble, "enter a red state, and try to scale the empathy
wall."8 2 Through careful ethnographic research, Hochschild empathically
listened to real individual Tea Partiers in Louisiana. She understood that "[w]e,
on both sides, wrongly imagine that empathy with the 'other' side brings an end
to clearheaded analysis when, in truth, it's on the other side of that [empathy]
bridge that the most important analysis can begin." 83 As a result, Hochschild
believes that there is a genuine opportunity for cooperation, at least on crossover
issues, between even the most otherwise ideologically opposed Americans.84

76

See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

77

HOCHSCHILD, supra note 67, at 5.
FRANK, supranote 2, at 84-85, 177.

78

7
80
81
82
83
84

CASHILL, supra note 2, at 327.
See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 67, at 8-10.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.

Id. at 10.
Id. at xi.
Id. at 232-36.
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3. Hearing Your Opponent's Deep Story
Based on her qualitative interviews with individual Red Staters,
Hochschild hypothesized that different worldviews-what she calls "deep
stor[ies]""s-might be behind Frank's Great Backlash." The WTM argument
thus might be more the "refraction" of the truth through different worldview
"prisms" than deliberately ignoring the truth.
i.

The Conservative Waiting-in-Line Deep Story

What was the deep story of the Louisiana Tea Partiers she befriended?
Ultimately, it was about fundamental fairness. Hochschild employs an extended
waiting-in-line analogy. A "good citizen" is following the rules and patiently
"'waiting in line' for a coveted reward-financial means and honored identity"
when "other people 'cut in line,' moving that person backward."" Then, a
"person standing ahead of them-more urbane and educated-turns around to
insult them for being backward, ill-educated, prejudiced[,] . . . a 'redneck,""'

or

a hillbilly.
Such good, patient line-standers "fear becoming 'strangers in their own
land."'89 The unfair, line-cutting "impostors" may appear to the hard-working,
rule-abiding "good citizens" to be either "falsely entitled insiders-blacks and
women who share their cultural and national identity but may come from a higher
social class and benefit from Affirmative Action programs of the federal
government" or "national or cultural outsiders-immigrantsand Muslims." 90
In both cases, the stander-in-line feels wronged. While partly
overlapping, the objects of blame, frustration, and resentment
differ. In both cases, the line cutters threaten not only the secure
social standing of the good citizen but also the stability of the
surrounding culture through which the waiting, the line, the
prize come to hold meaning. 91
Unlike Frank, who assumes that more government is the answer, 92 the
Tea Partiers Hochschild interviewed were "tired of government being in [their]

supra note 67, at 135-51.
supra note 2, at 5.
Hochschild, supra note 60, at 421.
Id
Id
Id at 421 (emphasis in original).

8

HOCHSCHILD,

86

FRANK,

8

88
89
90
91
92

Id
See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
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business."9 3 Their deep story focuses on the "freedom to" do things and not on
the "freedom from" harmful ills like pollution or gun violence.9 4 They hated the
government telling them what to do, like what light bulbs to buy or what to eat. 95
Instead of government, their story prefers church and community.9 6
Hochschild's Tea Partiers embrace the free market and understand that
all they can reasonably expect from self-interested companies are jobs. As one
related, "It's not in the company's own interest to have a spill or an accident.
They try hard.

. .

. [s]o if there's a spill, it's probably the best the company [can]

do." 97 Companies may be punitive and selfish, but at least they are honest.98
In contrast, Hochschild's Tea Partiers believed that government is
dishonest, lazy, and inefficient. 99 The federal government is a "bigger, badder
version of state government," and state government does business companies'
"moral dirty work."co
To her liberal left friends, Hochschild wrote that even though some
powerful right-wing organizers may succeed in appealing to the bad angels of
the conservative right, "that appeal obscures another-to the right wing's good
angels-theirpatience in waiting in line in scary economic times, their capacity
for loyalty, sacrifice, and endurance .

..

. Consider the possibility that in their

situation, you might end up closer to their perspective."' 01
ii.

The Liberal Public Square Deep Story

What of the liberal left's deep story? Although Hochschild's book
focused on understanding the conservative worldview, she did summarize a
liberal Democrat deep story, perhaps her own:
[P]eople stand around a large public square inside of which are
creative science museums for kids, public art and theater
programs, libraries, schools-a state-of-the-art public
infrastructure available for use by all. They are fiercely proud of
it. Some of them built it. Outsiders can join those standing
around the square, since a lot of people who are insiders now
were outsiders in the past; incorporation and acceptance of
difference feel like American values represented in the Statue of

9

HoCHSCHILD, supra note 67, at 58.

94

Id. at 71 (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 122.

95
96
97
98
9

100
101

See id. at 122-23.

Id. at 66 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Hochschild, supranote 60, at 421 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at 421-22.
Id at 422.
HoCHSCHILD, supra note 67, at 234 (emphasis in original).
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Liberty. But in the liberal deep story, an alarming event occurs;
marauders invade the public square, recklessly dismantle it, and
selfishly steal away bricks and concrete chunks from the public
buildings at its center. Seeing insult added to injury, those
guarding the public square watch helplessly as those who've
dismantled it construct private McMansions with the same
bricks and pieces of concrete, privatizing the public realm.' 02
In light of these different deep stories, Hochschild hypothesizes that both
liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans focus on different conflicts and
the different forms of unfairness that flow from those conflicts. While the left
focuses on the private sector, the 1% over-class versus the 99% emerging underon the public sector "as a service desk for a growing class
class, the right focuses
1 03
'takers."'
idle
of
Unlike the deductive WTM argument, Hochschild's deep story is
inductive. Formulating the analogy from the common threads in her individual
interviews with actual people, she also went back and confirmed the deep story's
accuracy with those same people.1 04 Hochschild added that her deep story
parallels other sociologists' interviews with Tea Partiers.'s Her deep story
provides an alternative explanation for the Great Backlash,1 06 one that combines
culture and empiricism without paternalism.
C

The WTM Argument's EmpiricalEvidence Is Mixed

Finally, even assuming away the many empirical problems with the
WTM argument's methodology, the empirical evidence that such voters are
voting against their supposed self-interest is at best mixed. The actual empirical
evidence is neither as clear nor as indisputable as the WTMargument claims.
1. Cashill and Frank Admit that Their Methods Lack Empirical Rigor
Both Cashill and, to a lesser extent, Frank admit that their books'
methodologies are not rigorously empirical. Initially, Cashill admirably aspires
to focus empirically on individual outcomes.o7 Later, Cashill admits his methods

102

Id at 235-36 (emphasis in original).

103

Id. at 236.
Id. at 145-46.

104

Id at 145 (citing Nils Kumkar, A Socio-Analysis of Discontent: Protests Against the Politics
of Crisis in the U.S. and Germany: An Empirical Comparison (Nov. 30, 2015) (unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Department of Sociology, University of Leipzig)); SKOCPOL & WILLIAMSON, supra note
66).
106
FRANK, supra note 2, at 5.
107
CASHILL, supra note 2, at 17.
105
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include "pure SWAG (sophisticated, wild-assed guess) estimates"1 8 and notes
that there is "nothing scientific about [the] survey."'0 9
Unlike Cashill, Frank is much more defensive. Frank describes his
methodology as "based on movement literature, local history, interviews, statelevel election results, and personal observation."'"o He admits that his book "is,
at its core, a cultural study, a look at the rhetoric and ideology of right-wing
populism.""' He also implicitly concedes that his WTM argument may suffer
from the stereotyping sampling error,'1 2 responding that his book "does not
require or depend upon a majoritarian argument of any kind; it only requires that
the cultural formation in question is significant or is somehow worth
examining.""

2. Social Science Reception of the WTMArgument Remains Mixed
As Frank himself describes, his book was "assailed by the director of a
prestigious Ivy League political science research center," namely Dr. Larry
Bartels." 4 In 2005, Bartels presented a paper critical of Frank's work, that he
later revised, at the American Political Science Association's annual meeting
aptly entitled, "What's the Matter with What's the Matter with Kansas?"''5
Bartels disputes Frank's premise that the white working-class votes against its
own self-interest. Other social scientists, however, have accepted Frank's
premise.
i.

White Working-Class Voting Against Its Self-Interest
Has Been Exaggerated

Bartels's critique and Frank's response mostly talk past each other,
reinforcing the fact that Frank's work ultimately is a polemic, not a serious
empirical study.Using statistical analyses of American National Election Study

108

Id at 22.

109

Id at 58.
Frank, supra note 62, at 1.
Id. at 17.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
Frank, supra note 62, at 17 (emphasis in original).

110
I'
112
113

Id.at1.
Bartels eventually published his critique. CompareLarry M. Bartels, What's the Matter with
What's the Matter with Kansas? (Sept. 1-4, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
https://inequality.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/media/_media/pdf/Reference%20Media/Bartels
2006_Social%20Class%20and%200ccupations.pdf [hereinafter WTM with WTM 2005], with
Larry M. Bartels, What's the Matter with What's the Matter with Kansas?, 1 Q. J. POL. Sci. 201,
201 (2006) [hereinafter WTMwith WTM2006].
114

115
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(ANES) surveys,"'6 Bartels quantitatively tested four specific questions based on
Frank's book: (1) "Has the white working class abandoned the Democratic
party?;"l 7 (2) "Do '[v]alues [m]atter [m]ost' to the [w]hite [w]orking
[c]lass?;"" 8 (3) "How do Frank's 'cultural wedge issues' test among his white
working-class voters?;""' and (4) "Is the Democratic Party [p]ursuing a
20
'[c]riminally [s]tupid [s]trategy'?"l
Bartels's empirical answer in 2006 was to disagree with Frank's
conclusion on every question. First, he claimed that white abandonment was
limited mostly to southern whites without college degrees and thus could be
12 1
explained away as resistance to Democratic civil rights support. Second, he
found no evidence that economic issues had diminished in white working-class
voter significance. 12 2 Third, he found working-class whites closer to Democrats
123
on abortion and gender and more liberal than both parties on gun control.
Finally, he disputed Frank's framing as "a ludicrous overreaction to the party's
current political difficulties."l 24
In 2006, a study of national survey data concluded that voters put much
more weight on economic issues than moral ones, implicitly disagreeing with
Frank. 125 In 2008, a study of white working-class labor union voters found that
white union voters fit Bartels's description while, conversely, white non-union
voters fit Frank's description. 126 In 2009, a voter registration study argued that
reliance on U.S. Presidential voting was misleading because the binary choice
cannot identify strength of party commitment. Instead, voter registrations
demonstrated that Americans were actually becoming more independent,
127
implicitly discrediting Frank's argument. In 2010, an income inequality study
found that higher-income Americans overall were more likely to vote Republican
than lower-income Americans but, unlike Frank, otherwise observed no clear

116

Home, AM. NAT'L ELECTION STUD., http://www.electionstudies.org/index.html (last visited

Mar. 29, 2018).
117
WTMwith WTM2006, supra note 115, at 205.
118

Id. at 211.

119

Id. at 218.

120

Id. at 219.
Id. at 224.

121

Id.
Id. at 224-25.
124
Id. at 223.
125
Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Purple America, 20 J. ECON. PERSPs. 97, 99 (2006).
Peter Francia, Voting on Values or Bread-and-Butter?:Effects of Union Membership on the
126
Politicsof the White Working Class, 12 PERSPECTIVES ON WORK 27 (Summer 2008/Winter 2009).
127
See Eric McGhee & Daniel Krimm, Party Registration and the Geography of Party
Polarization,41 POLITY 345, 345-46 (2009).
122

123
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relation between income inequality and class-based voting. 128 A 2010 symbolic
racism study disagreed with Frank's belief that Republican victories are not
based on racism. 129 In 2011, a survey of populist partisan images agreed with
Bartels that most Americans, including the working class, view Democrats as the
people's party.1 0
In 2018, Bartels's the-sky-is-not-falling-for-Democrats assessment
seems anachronistic. Congresswoman Cheri Bustos (D-IL), Co-Chair of the
Democratic Policy and Communications Committee for House Democrats and
Chair of Heartland Engagement for the Democratic Congressional Campaign
Committee, recently released a report notably through her own political action
committee and not the Democratic National Committee: Hope from the
Heartland:How Democrats Can Better Serve the Midwest by Bringing Rural,
Working Class Wisdom to Washington.13 ' In this report, Bustos interviewed 72
current or former Democratic officials who managed to be elected by rural,

predominantly Republican-voting constituents (including Appalachian Ohio).' 32
The Democrats interviewed in the Bustos report disagreed with
Bartels' and appeared to agree with much of Frank's critique. As the report
unambiguously noted, "Democrats from rural areas face an existential crisis. The
number of Democrats holding office across the nation is at its lowest point since
the 1920's and the decline has been especially severe in rural America, whose
economic fortunes have slipped markedly during this same period."l34
Since 2005, Bartels has refined his critique of Frank's WTM argument.
To Bartels, Frank's argument is "vastly exaggerated."'3 5 Instead, Bartels explains
the rural turn to the Republican Party with "three notable biases in the workings
of economic accountability in contemporary American electoral politics:"'36 (1)

128
Andrew Gelman et al., Income Inequality and PartisanVoting in the United
States, 91 Soc.
Scl. Q. 1203, 1203, 1213 (2010).
129
Pearl Ford et al., What's the Matterwith Arkansas? Symbolic Racism and
2008 Presidential
CandidateSupport, 40 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 286, 299-300 (2010).
130
Stephen Nicholson & Gary Segura, Who's the Partyofthe People? Economic
Populism and
the U.S. Public'sBeliefs About PoliticalParties, 34 POL. BEHAVIOR 369, 369 (2012).
131
CHERI BusTos & ROBIN JOHNSON, HOPE FROM THE HEARTLAND:
How DEMOCRATS CAN
BETTER SERVE THE MIDWEST BY BRINGING RURAL, WORKING CLASS WISDOM TO WASHINGTON

(2018), https://medium.com/@cherpacpress/hope-from-the-heartland-how-democrats-can-betterserve-the-midwest-by-bringing-rural-working-e5ff746f9839 (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
132
Id. at 3.
133
To be fair to Bartels, he did clarify in his study, "My analysis implies no
particular political
strategy for Democrats (or, for that matter, for Republicans)." WTM with WTM 2005, supra note
115, at 31.
134

BUSTOs & JOHNSON, supra note 131, at 2.

135

LARRY M. BARTELS, UNEQUAL DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF THE NEW GILDED

AGE 75 (2d ed. 2016).
136

Id
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voter myopia that "respond[s] strongly" to election-year income growth while
137
forgetting most of the incumbent President's past economic performance; (2)
even lower-income voters focus more on "election-year income growth among
13 8
affluent families" than on their own or the entire nation's; and (3) Republican
139
campaign spending over Democrats has swayed voters. Bartels estimates that
these three biases "have probably added almost four percentage points to the
average Republican popular vote and altered the outcomes of five of the past 16
presidential elections." 40
ii.

There Is Scholarly Supportfor Frank's WTM
Argument.

Unlike Bartels, many social scientists have accepted Frank's book. In
Stonecash wondered if widespread academic acceptance of Frank's
Jeffrey
2014,
thesis was uncritical and biased. 14 1 He speculated that academic disappointment
over the working class's failure to "fulfill[] the image of the revolting proletariat"
might have influenced academics to "uncritically accept[]" the unconvincing
WTM argument. 14 2
Accepting Frank's WTM argument, a 2009 sociological study, ironically
employing the same ANES data Bartels used, identified six possible
explanations. White working-class voters believe Republican economic policies
(1) will help them now; (2) will help them when they become rich; (3) reward
hard work and are ideologically correct even if they don't personally benefit; (4)
alone are bad but support those policies when combined with values issues like
abortion, gay marriage, or foreign policy; (5) because they are misinformed; or
43
(6) are bad but vote Republican anyway to favor trumping "moral values."
Contradicting Bartels, the study concluded that ANES data did not support the
first five explanations and, consistent with Frank's thesis, argued for the last
explanation. 144
Frank inspired Hochshild's ethnographic work. 145 As recently as 2017,
careful sociologists like William Davies have characterized Frank's book as

137

Id.

138

Id.
Id.
Id. at 76.

139
140

141
Jeffrey Stonecash, Thinking About Young, in Karen Cerulo, ForumMailbox, 29 Soc. FORUM
240, 240-41 (2014).
142
Id.
143
Monica Prassad et al., The Undeserving Rich: "Moral Values" and the White Working
Class, 24 Soc. FORUM 225, 226-27 (2009).

144

Id. at 227.

145

HOCHSCHILD, supra note 67, at 8.
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"superb."1 4 6 Foreign Affairs called it "fresh," "engaging," and "sadly
conventional."' 47 Frank's thesis appears popular among "despair[ing]" and
"bemuse[d]" Europeans.1 48 Political historian Brian Glenn credits Frank with
identifying a "Fourth Great Awakening."1 49 In 2012, Katherine Walsh offered an
alternative to both Frank and Bartels where rural voters rationally intertwine their
economic and values interests through "rural consciousness. "10
In 2013, Frank Young found some statistical support for Frank's
assertions that "the working class does vote Republican" and that such workingclass voting correlates with a "decline in average county population," but
theorized that "the fear that whites experience as the white population shrinks
causes the backlash reaction and the Republican vote that Frank describes."s1 In
2014, Frank's own magazine cited an economic ideology study (that curiously
never cites Frank) as claiming it "can empirically prove" that the WTM argument
"is true." 1 52
Although, as Frank described, the WTM argument is "significant" and
"worth examining,"lS3 there is no support for applying it categorically to entire
diverse populations like Appalachia. As Young recognized, the WTM argument
"does not attempt to separate facts from theory." 154 From an empirical
perspective, as Glenn realized, a "convincing argument is different from one that
has been tested robustly and compared to other states."' The best way to use
polemics like the WTM argument therefore is to test them empirically instead of
uncritically accepting their appealing arguments.

William Davies, A Review of Arlie Russell Hochschild's Strangers in Their Own
Land:
Anger and Mourning on the American Right, 30 INT'L J. POL. CULTURE & Soc'Y 413, 415 (2017).
147
Walter Mead, What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won
the Heart of
America, FOREIGN AFFS., Nov.-Dec. 2004, at 151 (book review).
148
See Lawrence Avery, What's the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won
the Heart
ofAmerica, 81 INT'L AFF. 891, 891 (2005) (book review).
146

149

Brian J. Glenn, Kansas Politics in the Bigger Picture:A Review Essay of
What's the Matter
with Kansas?, 2 FORUM, no. 4, 2004, at 1, 13-16.
150
Katherine Cramer Walsh, Putting Inequality in Its Place: Rural Consciousness
and the

Power ofPerspective, 106 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 517, 517-18 (2012).
151

Frank W. Young, "What's the Matter with Kansas?" A Sociological Answer,
28 Soc.

FORUM 864, 864 (2013). This Essay's analysis does not support Young's conclusion concerning
population decline. See infra Figures la, Ib, & Ic.
152

Lauren Kirchner, We Do Actually Know What's the Matter with Kansas,
BAFFLER, Aug. 20,

2014 (citing Stefan Krasa & Mattias Polborn, Social Ideology and Taxes in Diferentiated
Candidates Framework, 104 AM. ECON. REv. 308 (2014)), https://thebaffler.com/latest/we-doactually-know-whats-the-matter-with-kansas.
'15
Frank, supra note 62, at 17 (emphasis in original).
154

Young, supra note 151, at 865.

155

Glenn, supra note 149, at 12.
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III. AM I BETTER OFF THAN FOUR YEARS AGO?

Examining how Appalachians may actually have answered President
Reagan's "Are you better off than you were four years ago?""' question, this
57
Essay initially tests the WTM argument' with three correlation studies. After
summarizing the findings of a 2008 empirical study of Appalachian voting in the
2004 Presidential election,' this Essay conducts three linear regression analyses
of Appalachian and national U.S. Presidential election voting patterns from
1980-2016 compared to Appalachian and national (1) population growth, (2)
unemployment levels, and (3) median income growth over the same period. This
initial analysis suggests that neither population growth, unemployment levels,
nor median income growth can conclusively explain Appalachia's U.S.
Presidential voting shift from Democrat to Republican. Accordingly, this limited
patterns
study concurs with the 2008 study that Appalachian county-level voting
59
do not appear to be particularly distinctive for the variables studied.1
A.

County-level Analysis of2004 U.S. PresidentialElection

As Robert Bickel and Cheryl Brown observed in their 2008 analysis of
Appalachian voting behavior, the WTM argument has been frequently applied to
Appalachia.' In their county-level analysis of the 2004 U.S. Presidential
election, they concluded that "a distinctive Appalachian voting pattern,
autonomous of usual demographic measures, does not exist."' More
specifically, once Bickel and Brown "statistically controlled for[]
commonplace . . county-level demographic variables such as median income,

Bret Schulte, Ronald Reagan v. Jimmy Carter: "Are You Better Off than You Were Four
156
5:00 PM),
17, 2008,
& WORLD REP. (Jan.
NEWS
U.S.
Years Ago? ",
200
8/01/17/the-actor-and-the-detail-man.
https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
157

See supraPart I.

158

Bickel & Brown, supra note 12, at 99.

Id. at 114.
Bickel and Brown observed the stereotyping sampling error in WTM arguments about
Appalachia:
Stereotypes of Appalachia are well known and frequently invoked. Typically,
they represent Appalachians as afflicted with a distinctive culture of poverty
marked by a short-sighted inability to defer gratification in rational pursuit of
goals needed to attain a reasonable level of success in a modem society.
Appalachians are commonly viewed as passive, easy to manipulate adherents
of a "God, guts, and guns!" right-wing populism that blinds them to their own
best interests. In the politically charged environment that has prevailed in the
U.S. for the past two decades, this distinctive Appalachian culture has been
cited as the source of distinctively Appalachian voting patterns.
159

160

Bickel & Brown, supra note 12, at 99.
161
Id. at 99 (emphasis in original).
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level of educational attainment, and ethnic composition," they found that overall
"there is nothing distinctive about Appalachian county-level voting patterns."1 62
Bickel and Brown, however, did find some correlation with Frank's
WTM thesis. 163 Using the Office of Management and Budget's 2003
classification of Rural-Urban Continuum codes (also known as "Beale
Codes") 164 for every Appalachian county, they found that "for each 1 percent
increase in the degree to which a county is rural, the county-level vote for [the
Republican candidate] Bush increased, on average, by 0.451 percent." 16 5
Mentioning Frank's book, they concluded that the "emergence of right-wing
populism as a rural and small town political force is one important reason for the
ascendance of the Republican Party over the past couple of decades." 6 6
B. Do County Economic Well-Being Variables
Correlatewith US. PresidentialElection Voting?
This statistical analysis attempted to identify the relationship, if any, of
select characteristics of each county in Appalachia, as defined by the
Appalachian Regional Commission, 167 to how that county voted in U.S.
Presidential general elections from 1980 to 2016. Three variables were selected
based on their impact on the economic well-being of a county: (1) Population
Growth, (2) Unemployment Levels, and (3) Median Income Growth. Using
standard spreadsheet software and GIS, a regression model was generated
comparing each economic dataset as an independent variable (XPopuiation,
XUnemployment, and Xncome) with election data as the dependent variable (YElection 16 8).
162

163

Id. at 114.
FRANK, supra note 2, at 149-52.

164
Rural-Urban Continuum Codes "form a classification scheme that
distinguishes
metropolitan (metro) counties by the population size of their metro area, and nonmetropolitan
(nonmetro) counties by degree of urbanization and adjacency to a metro area or areas." Rural-

Urban Continuum Codes, NAT'L INSTS. HEALTH:
EPIDEMIOLOGY,

AND

END

NAT'L CANCER
RESULTS

INST:

SURVEILLANCE,
PROGRAM,

https://seer.cancer.gov/seerstat/variables/countyattribs/ruralurban.html (last updated Apr. 15,
2014).
165
Bickel & Brown, supranote 12, at 112.
166
Id.
167
To determine the GIS county boundary shapefile for Appalachia, the analysis
used U.S.
Census data. Cartographic Boundary Shapefiles - Counties, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/data/cbf/cbf counties.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
The counties used matched the ADRA's definition of Appalachia. See The Appalachian Region,
supra note 9.
168
Election data was compiled from three sources: (1) the U.S. Census for 1980
to 2008 data;
(2) the United Kingdom newspaper The Guardianfor 2012 data; and (3) OpenDataSoft for 2016
data.
See U.S.
Census
Bureau, Census
Table, Election
Data,
1980-2008,
http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/usac/excel/ELE01.xls (last visited Dec. 12, 2017); 2012
U.S.
Election
Data
by
County,
GUARDIAN,
http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-
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Each test yields an Appalachian and national graphical output model and an R2
value, which are used to explain to what extent the independent variable
influences the dependent variable.
1. U.S. Presidential Election Results in Appalachia, 1980-2016
Table la ("Appalachian Voting Patterns in U.S. Presidential Elections,
1980-2016") below summarizes how Appalachia overall voted in the 1980-2016
U.S. Presidential elections. The only two elections in this time frame in which
the Appalachian winner did not go on to win the national election were the 2008
16 9
Of the 10 presidential
and 2012 elections of President Barack Obama.
elections shown in Table 1 a, Appalachia voted for a Democratic candidate only
twice. The margins of victory in Appalachia for those two elections were the
lowest of any candidate. By far, the largest margin of victory occurred in the
most recent election in 2016, when Republican candidate Donald Trump won
Appalachia by a margin of nearly 31%. For comparison, Table lb ("National
Voting Patterns in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1980-2016") summarizes how the
United States voted overall in the 1980-2016 U.S. Presidential elections.

files/Guardian/documents/2012/11/14/US_elect county.xls (last visited Mar. 29, 2018);
OpenDataSoft USA 2016 Presidential Election by County (published by Deleetdk of GitHub),
https://data.opendatasoft.com/explore/dataset/usa-2016-presidential-election-bycounty@public/download/?format-xls&timezone=America/New York&use labels for_
header-true (last visited Mar. 29, 2018).
169
See Presidential General Election, All States, 2008 and 2012 Summaries, CQ PRESS
LIBRARY, http://library.cqpress.com/elections/search.php (last visited Jan. 30, 2018).
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Table la: Appalachian Voting Patterns in U.S. Presidential Elections,
1980-2016.o170
Election
Winning Party
Winning Candidate Margin of
Year
Victory
1980
Republican
Ronald Reagan
3.6%
1984
Republican
Ronald Reagan
16.7%
1988
Republican
George H. W. Bush
10.1%
1992
Democrat
Bill Clinton
1.7%
1996
Democrat
Bill Clinton
0.1%
2000
Republican
George W. Bush
11.8%
2004
Republican
George W. Bush
17.9%
2008
Republican
John McCain
15.6%
2012
Republican
Mitt Ronmey
8.6%
2016
Republican
Donald Trump
30.9%
Table 1b: National Voting Patterns in U.S. Presidential Elections,
1980-2016. 171
Election
Winning Party
Winning Candidate Margin of
Year
Victory
1980
Republican
Ronald Reagan
10.6%
1984
Republican
Ronald Reagan
18.34%
1988
Republican
George H. W. Bush
7.8%
1992
Democrat
Bill Clinton
6.92%
1996
Democrat
Bill Clinton
9.48%
2000
Republican
George W. Bush
0.52%
2004
Republican
George W. Bush
2.48%
2008
Democrat
Barack Obama
7.38%
2012
Democrat
Barack Obama
3.92%
2016
Republican
Donald Trump
2.22%
2. Appalachian County Well-Being Compared to Election Results
Table 2 ("Appalachian and National Regression Analyses") below
summarizes the variables and Appalachian and national R 2 results of the three.
tests. The Essay shall illustrate and explain each test in turn.

170
See
Presidential
Elections,
HISTORY,
http://www.history.com/topics/uspresidents/presidential-elections (last visited Mar. 29, 2018) (source of winning candidate name);
U.S. Election 2016, BBC, http://www.bbc.com/news/election/us20l6/results (last visited Mar. 29,

2018).

171
See PresidentialGeneralElection, All States, 1980-2016 Summaries,
CQ PRESS LIBRARY,
http://library.cqpress.com/elections/search.php (last visited Mar. 29, 2018) (subtracted smaller

percentage from larger percentage under "Major Party Vote (%)" column).
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Table 2: Appalachian and National Regression Analyses
Appalachian National
Dependent Variable
Independent
R 2 Value
R Value
Variable
(YElection)
1 72

XPopulation

Xenemptoymentl
74
XIncomel

73

Vote Shift from 1980-2016
Vote Shift from 1992-2016
Vote Shift from 1980-2016

0.018
0.0006
0.12

0.0036
0.0634
0.0468

XPopulation data was compiled from two sources: (1) the National Bureau of Economic
Research (NBER) for 1970 to 2009 and (2) the U.S. Census Bureau for 2010 to 2016. See Census
U.S. Intercensal County Population Data, 1970-2014, NAT'L BUREAU ECON. RES.,
http://www.nber.org/data/census-intercensal-county-population.html (last updated Mar. 29, 2016);
County Population Totals and Components of Change, 2010-2017, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2017/demo/popest/counties-total.html (last updated Mar. 29,
172

2018).
data was compiled from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for the years 1990 to
2016.
See
Local Area
Unemployment
Statistics, U.S
BUREAU
LAB.
STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/lau/#cntyaa (last visited Mar. 29, 2018) (county data table and map).
174
Xcome data was compiled from two separate U.S. Census files: (1) Median Household
Income from the 1980 Census and (2) Median Household Income, 2007-2016; See Small Area
BUREAU,
CENSUS
Program, U.S.
(SAIPE)
Poverty
Estimates
and
Income
https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/saipe.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2017); USA Counties
Data
File
Downloads,
U.S.
CENSUS
BUREAU,
173

XUnemployment

https://www.census.gov/support/USACdataDownloads.html
(households).
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Figure la: Appalachian Population - Voting Analysis.
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Figure la ("Appalachian Population - Voting Analysis") compares
Appalachian population change from 1980 to 2016 with the absolute value of
variation in voting results among all presidential general elections from 1980 to
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2016. This first model cites a strong correlation between population change and
voting results (R 2 = 0.2402). As population growth increases, the variation in
voting results between elections increases as well. Consequently, the counties
with lower or negative growth rates exhibit lower variation in voting results
between elections, according to this model.
Initially, this appears to be the most robust of the three regression
models, even though it contradicts the authors' expected outcome. The model
suggests that counties with declining populations are more likely to stick to the
same party every election, which would support the WTM argument that more
rural Republican voters vote against their economic interests."' If outlier
counties that experienced extremely high population growth-some as high as
700%-are, however, removed from the model, then the regression value
quickly and steadily drops. Figure laa ("Histogram of Figure la Data
(Appalachian Population - Voting Analysis)" illustrates these outlier counties.

1'

See FRANK, supra note 2, at 68, 76 (listing depopulation as an economic problem).
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Figure laa: Histogram ofFigure la Data
(AppalachianPopulation- Voting Analysis).
Population Change of Appalachian Counties from 1980-2016
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Figure laa ("Histogram of Figure la Data (Appalachian Population
Voting Analysis)") indicates that those Appalachian counties experiencing very
high population growth may have skewed the model. Six Georgia counties in the
Atlanta, Georgia, metropolitan area, Barrow, Cherokee, Dawson, Forsyth,
Gwinnett, and Paulding Counties, 17 6 all experienced over 250% population
growth-more than five times the national average of 44%-from 1980 to 2016.

176

See Metro Atlanta Regional Map: Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Roswell, GA MSA, METRO
CHAMBER, https://www.metroatlantachamber.com/resources/most-popular/map-of-

ATLANTA

metro-atlanta (last visited Mar. 22, 2018).
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Having a rapidly growing population leads to new people with many new values
and beliefs entering an area, which could subsequently drive greater variation in
voting results. Because this analysis is limited to the individual shift from one
U.S. Presidential election to the next one four years later, it does not account for
the overall Democrat to Republican trend that appears predominant in

Appalachia.
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Figure 1b: AppalachianPopulation- Voting Analysis Revised.
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Replacing the election variation data with a cumulative dataset that takes
the sum of the percentage difference of Appalachian votes cast from 1980 to
2016 for the Republican and Democratic nominees addresses the overall
Republican U.S. Presidential voting shift. This revised analysis is illustrated in
Figure lb ("Appalachian Population - Voting Analysis Revised"). Comparing
this dataset of vote shift to population growth from the 1980 to 2016 elections
yields quite a different result in Figure lb. In fact, the result is insignificant (R2
= 0.0036), meaning that population growth in Appalachia is a bootless variable
for explaining voting patterns. Although the political pundits may speculate that
population decline will drive voters to change, this analysis shows how this
would be baseless in the case of Appalachia.
For comparison, Figure Ic ("National Population - Voting Analysis")
below depicts the same analysis on a national level. Much like Figure la's
Appalachian analysis, population change had minimal impact on voting change
(R2 = 0.018). There was a slight downward nationwide trend indicating that U.S.
counties which shifted more Republican/less Democrat tended to exhibit lower
population growth.
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Figure 1c: National Population- Voting Analysis.
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Figure 2a: Appalachian Unemployment - Voting Analysis.

J

0

.,~

*

W.u

------ ----- ------

M.rt

o,1

...
... ...

........ ...

.....

.

.....

.

... ...........

o1AI~

SW0 SMR.AP

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2018

31

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 120, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 8

880

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120

Figure 2a ("Appalachian Unemployment - Voting Analysis") above
compares the value of percentage change in Appalachian voting results between
the 1992 and 2016 Presidential elections with the percentage change in
unemployment from 1992 to 2016. Although similar to Figure lb ("Appalachian
Population - Voting Analysis Revised") above in its use of the overall voting
shift from Democrat to Republican, Figure 2a differs in temporal scale by
beginning in 1992. This is due to the lack of available unemployment data prior
to 1990. The average unemployment change was -3.0%. The average voting
pattern shift was 47.9%.
In this analysis, the change in unemployment appears to explain only 6%
of voting patterns. Although the R 2 value of 0.0634 is low, it trends slightly
downward. This suggests that Appalachian counties which experienced a greater
drop in unemployment from 1992 to 2016 exhibit more dramatic voting shift
from Democratic to Republican in that period. Inversely, counties with more
steady or even growing unemployment rates from 1992 to 2016 exhibit a slightly
less Republican or slightly more Democratic shift. Although only a minor
correlation, it is surprising.
For comparison, Figure 2b ("National Unemployment - Voting
Analysis") below demonstrates that nationwide unemployment had no
correlation to how each county voted (R 2 = 0.0006). Although the overall
relationship remains attenuated, unemployment comparatively had a much
greater impact on voting shift in Appalachia than nationally.
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Figure 2b: National Unemployment - Voting Analysis.
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Figure 3a: Appalachian Income - Voting Analysis.
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Figure 3a ("Appalachian Income - Voting Analysis") analyzes the
overall Appalachian percentage vote shift from Democrat to Republican and
median household income changes from 1980 to 2016. The values for income
were for the year prior to the election as Election Day is statutorily mandated to
occur on the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November,177 prior to the end
of the year. From 1980 to 2016, the mean value of median household income
growth is $28,700 for an average increase of $800 per year. From 1980 to 2016,
the average shift of Appalachian voting from Democrat to Republican is 42.6%.
Although the resulting regression value is low (R2 = 0.0468) with income change
explaining less than 5% of the voting pattern shift from Democrat to Republican
from 1980 to 2016, as income growth decreased, the shift from Democrat to
Republican increased.
Figure 3b ("Income Change in Appalachia") geographically depicts the
severity of median household income change in Appalachian counties from 1979
to 2015. The spatial distribution of counties with the largest drop in income rank
is clustered in the Central Appalachian sub-region.
Finally, for comparison, Figure 3c ("National Income - Voting
Analysis") analyzes the national percentage vote shift from Democrat to
Republican and median household income changes from 1980 to 2016. Of the
three tests, this income analysis had the highest national regression value (R 2 =
0.12). Although the overall relationship remains attenuated, household income
changes overall had a much greater impact on voting shift nationally than in
Appalachia.

17

See 2 U.S.C. § 7 (2012).
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Figure 3b: Income Change in Appalachia
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Figure 3c: National Income - Voting Analysis
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IV. CONCLUSION: UNIFIED IN DIGNIFIED APPALACHIAN PRIDE

Upon what can Red and Blue Appalachians, Frank and Cashill, and
Democrats and Republicans agree? That-by every statistical measuresocioeconomic inequality in the United States has grown more extreme over the
last 30 years.' 78 At its core, the WTM argument makes empirical claims about
poor Americans.1 79 Red conservatives and Blue liberals provide contrasting and
often conflicting prescriptions and diagnoses for this national malaise.
Arlie Hochschild wonders if the future focus will be on "main street
capitalism" versus "global capitalism" and "competitive capitalism" versus
"monopoly" capitalism.s0 Quoting Robert Reich, she appears to believe that the
"major fault line in American politics will shift from Democrat versus
Republican to anti-establishment versus establishment," or those who "see the
game as rigged" versus "those who don't.""'8
Upon what can Appalachians, against whom the "game" in the past has
undeniably been "rigged," agree? As a starting point, Appalachians can agree
that the target audience for all laws and policies in Appalachia should be
individual Appalachians. The only benefits and improvements that should matter
are those that stay within Appalachia's borders. Despite Appalachia's prodigious
natural resource wealth, its "prime resource" remains, as President John F.
Kennedy's Presidential Appalachian Regional Commission ("PARC") observed
in 1964, its "people."1 82
When reviewing national or international law or policy, the Appalachian
Region needs to follow PARC's original wisdom and maintain solidarity as a
Region. Upon first meeting as a Commission, PARC wisely recognized that
Appalachia's best hope was to remain unified and seek integrated solutions that
devote "attention to the entire [R]egion."183 "Future growth in all of the
Appalachian subregions must be interdependent," observed PARC, "Prosperity
in the urban centers cannot reach desired levels unless the hinterlands also
prosper. Solutions must be devised to assist both."'84

178

See

Facts:

Income

Inequality
in
the
United States,
INEQUALITY.ORG
https://inequality.org/facts/income-inequality/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2018) (citing Emmanuel Saez,
Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States 4 (June 30, 2016) (updated
with 2015 preliminary estimates), https://eml.berkeley.edu/-saez/saez-UStopincomes-2015.pdf)).
179
See supra Part I.
Iso

HOCHSCHILD, supranote 67, at 236.

1s1

Id. (quoting ROBERT B. REICH, SAvING CAPITALISM: FOR THE MANY, NOT THE FEW 188

(Alfred A. Knopf 2015)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
182

PRESIDENT'S APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION,

APPALACHIA: A REPORT BY THE

PRESIDENT'S APPALACHIAN REGIONAL COMMISSION 1964, 21 (1964)
https://www.arc.gov/noindex/aboutarc/history/parc/PARCReport.pdf
183

Id. at xviii.

184

Id.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol120/iss3/8
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Even though Appalachia remains composed of unique counties and
states with tremendous diversity,' the continuing national and international
view of Appalachia as a unified Region may be the stereotyping sampling
error's 18 6 only benefit. At least as a political force, essentialism continues to work
for Appalachia.' United we stand, divided we fall.
If Appalachia was considered its own state, the Appalachian Region's
2015 population of 25,417,532 would make it the third largest state in the Union,
behind California and Texas and in front of Florida.' 8 8 With 12 states contained
within its borders, 189 Appalachia has access to and influence over 24 U.S.
Senators' 90 (almost a fourth of the Senate-many more than California and
92
Texas, which each only have two Senators' 91 ), 61 U.S. Representatives1 (more
than California's 55193 and Texas' 38'94) and 12 state governments.
Controversially, in light of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Appalachia has
access to 85. electors, or about 16% of the 538 total electors in the Electoral
College' 95 (more than California's 55196 and Texas's 38'11).

185
186

187

See Stump & Lofaso, supra note 3, at 829-35.
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
For a definition of essentialism, see supra note 5.

Compare KELVIN POLLARD & LINDA A. JACOBSEN, THE APPALACHIAN REGION: A DATA
OVERVIEW FROM THE 2011-2015 AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY CHARTBOOK 5 (Mar. 2017),
188

https://www.arc.gov/assets/research-reports/DataOverviewfrom2O11 to2Ol5ACS.pdf, with State
Population by Rank, 2015, INFOPLEASE, https://www.infoplease.com/us/states/state-populationrank-2015 (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
189
See The Appalachian Region, supra note 9.
190
Appalachia as defined by ARC includes 12 states. See id. Each state is entitled to two U.S.
Senators. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
191
See id.
192

See GIS ANALYSIS, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS LOCATED PARTIALLY OR COMPLETELY IN

APPALACHIA (Jan. 19, 2018) (on file with authors).
193
United States
Congressional Delegations from
Calfornia, BALLOTPEDIA
(last visited
https://ballotpedia.org/UnitedStatescongressional-delegations-fromCalifornia
Feb. 25, 2018).
194
United
States
Congressional Delegations from
Texas,
BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org/United Statescongressional-delegations-from-Texas (last visited Feb.
25, 2018).
195

See generally What is the Electoral College?, NAT'L ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMIN.,

https://www.archives.gov/federal-register/electoral-college/about.html (last visited Feb. 25,2018).
A state's number of electors is one for each Representative and two for each Senator. Id.
196

Electoral

College

Information,

CAL.

SECRETARY

ST.,

http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/electoral-college/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
197
Presidential
Election
in
Texas,
2016,
BALLOTPEDIA,
ttps://ballotpedia.org/Presidential election-inTexas, 2016 (last visited Feb. 28, 2018).
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If Appalachia's votes did indeed spell the difference in the 2016
Presidential election,1 98 then let us maintain that collective political clout for the
collective benefit. Appalachians cannot be expected to do anything but stick
together in self-interest.
Considering the declining population and poverty of many Appalachian
counties,' 9 9 with only Appalachian Alabama and West Virginia consisting of the
majority of their respective states, 2 00 if the Region divides into its constituent
state or county identities, then each weaker, divided subunit surely will fall on
its own. Within a state, Appalachian counties need to maintain solidarity. And
needless to say, Appalachians within their respective counties need to promote
laws and policies that best help those within their borders.
Although focusing on demonstrable, empirical evidence of Appalachian
benefits provides a starting point, that starting point only goes so far. Even the
best empirical research cannot avoid the inevitable value choices in all law and
policy. 20 1 But limiting those value choices to fellow Appalachians can cabin
options and encourage true bipartisanship.
For example, Appalachia's number one priority remains jobs. As PARC
observed, "A decent job is necessary for the preservation of dignity." 20 2 From a
legal and policy perspective, perhaps the fiercest debated question in Appalachia
remains whether we are doing enough or too much to attract more decent jobs to
the Region. 2 03 The Region's history and current dearth of lasting jobs
demonstrates that perhaps in the past too much was done to attract jobs with little
to show for it.2 04 Perhaps the problem was that too often the beneficiaries, the
target audience of laws and policies that impacted Appalachians, were people
outside the Region who gave nothing permanent back to the Region.205 Perhaps
the problem is false dichotomies like saying we can have jobs or a better

198

See Catte, supranote 3.

19

POLLARD & JACOBSEN, supra note 188.

200

See KELVIN POLLARD & LINDA A. JACOBSEN, THE APPALACHAN REGION IN 2010:
A CENSUS

DATA OVERVIEW CHARTBOOK 2 (2011), http://www.prb.org/pdfl2/appalachia-census-chartbook2011 .pdf (comparing Appalachian and non-Appalachian population by state).
201
See Will Rhee, Evidence-BasedFederal Civil Rulemaking: A New ContemporaneousCase
Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60, 149 (2013).
202
PARC, supra note 182, at 49.
203
See, e.g., Jim Justice, Jim Justice: Lack of Jobs CreatesSo Many of State's Ills, HERALDDISPATCH (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.herald-dispatch.com/opinion/jim-justice-lack-of-jobscreates-so-many-of-state/article 67c454a4-7664-5adf-bc78-3266a5008190.html. Jim Justice was
elected Governor of West Virginia in 2016. See About Jim, OFF. OF THE GOVERNOR: JIM JUSTICE,
https://govemor.wv.gov/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 25, 2018).
204
See STEVEN STOLL, RAMP HOLLOW: THE ORDEAL OF APPALACHIA 263-71 (2017).
205
See id.
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environment, 206 or jobs and individual rights, 20 7 but not both. Perhaps all
Appalachians have been snookered by the whims of chameleon corporations
which when convenient can switch between an apolitical, impersonal economic
space and a political, personal space.208
Or perhaps the problem is that Appalachia is not doing enough to attract
good jobs. In 2017, for example, CNBC named West Virginia, the only state
entirely in Appalachia,20 9 the worst state for business in the nation.210 President
Donald Trump is correct that if Appalachia cannot attract more jobs, then, like
urban Appalachians before them, 2 1' Appalachians need to move to where the jobs
are. 212

The answer to this question is not only beyond the scope of this Essay
but also probably beyond anyone's ability to answer. The best we can do is adopt
laws and policies through an imperfect political process. Publicly articulating the
anticipated benefits or burdens on the target audience that those laws and policies
should have identifies empirical assumptions. Through genuine empirical
evidence about the target audience, we can truly hold lawmakers and
policymakers accountable. Did their assumptions about our fellow Appalachians
become reality? If not, can they admit that their assumptions proved wrong and
experiment with a different approach? 213
Returning to our example, perhaps short-term money and benefits must
temporarily flow outside Appalachia to attract jobs. But for the long-term, the
benefits that relevant laws and policies brought to individual Appalachians must
outweigh the costs. 2 1 4 If somebody must get rich to bring jobs to Appalachia,
then let that person be an Appalachian committed to Appalachia as opposed to a
New York City robber baron. And if a partisan side loses the political debate

See HOCHSCHILD, supra note 67, at 62-63.
See DAVID A. CORBIN, LIFE, WORK, AND REBELLION IN THE COAL FIELDS: THE SOUTHERN
WEST VIRGINIA MINERS, 1880-1922 10 (W. Va. Univ. Press ed., 2d ed. 2015)
208
See Davies, supra note 146, at 419.
209
See The AppalachianRegion, supra note 9.
210
Scott Cohn, In an Economic Death Spiral: West Virginia Is America's Worst State for
Business in 2017, CNBC (July 12, 2017, 4:11 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/11/westvirginia-americas-worst-state-for-business-in-2017.html.
211
For a definition of urban Appalachians, see supra note 10.
212
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over that particular policy, let the loser lose gracefully, proud that at least a local
who shall give back to Appalachia is benefiting from the loss, and, hopefully,
aware that public reason will hold the policy politically accountable to deliver
real, measurable improvement to Appalachian lives.
For as Ohio Governor John Gilligan understood:
No part of this country has given more to the progress of the
nation-and paid more profoundly for it-than Appalachia....
We have to be ingenious enough to protect the pride of mountain
families and their children.

the Appalachian Region.215

. .

. For in that pride lies the future of

And as Appalachian June Carter Cash understood, despite our continuing
poverty and ideological differences, we Appalachians can remain unified,
dignified, and happy in our genuine Appalachian pride.2 16
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